Predicting and dissecting the seats-votes curve in the 2006 U.S. House election by Kastellec, Jonathan P. et al.
Predicting and Dissecting the Seats-Votes Curve
in the 2006 U.S. House Election
Jonathan P. Kastellec, Columbia University
Andrew Gelman, Columbia University
Jamie P. Chandler, City University of New York
A s the 2006 midterm elections ap-proached, pollsters, scholars, and
journalists attempted to predict whether
the Democrats would take back the
House, Senate, or both. Much media at-
tention was paid to President George W.
Bush’s declining popularity and the
public’s dissatisfaction with the
Republican-controlled Congress ~see e.g.,
Cook 2006!. With most attention paid to
the immediate political dynamics of the
campaign, less noticed ~though not en-
tirely neglected! was the fact that the
Democrats faced a significant structural
disadvantage in their effort to retake both
houses of Congress. The Democrats
faced an uphill battle to control the Sen-
ate simply due to the small number of
seats that were seriously contested. Their
hurdle to taking over the House was sub-
tler but perhaps just as high: as we show
here, they needed to win well over half
the vote share in order to have an even
chance of winning 50% of the seats,
thereby overcoming a structural advan-
tage enjoyed by Republicans leading up
to Election Day.
The Democrats were seeking to end
12 years of Republican control of the
House. As Erikson ~2006! notes, control
of Congress is not simply a function of
the preferences of the electorate; factors
such as geography, incumbency advan-
tage, and partisan bias in the seats-votes
curve influence which party controls
Congress, and for how long. The Demo-
crats in 2006 had to overcome both a
built-in incumbency advantage for the
Republicans and a significant partisan
bias that had emerged in favor of the
Republicans following their takeover of
the House in 1994. In fact, in four of
the five elections between 1996 and
2004, Democratic candidates won more
votes on average than their Republican
opponents, yet were unable to retake the
House.1 This bias is consistent with the
well-known tendency that the party in
power tends to win a greater share of
seats than votes ~Tufte 1973!. Figure 1
illustrates this phenomenon, depicting
the average district vote for Democrats
as well as their share of House seats
from 1946–2006. The Democrats en-
joyed a large partisan bias during their
40-year reign over the House. The bias
switched to the Republicans following
their victory in 1994, and they enjoyed
that advantage leading up to the 2006
elections.
In this article we document this parti-
san bias, examine how and to what ex-
tent the Democrats overcame it, and
offer predictions as to whether the results
of the 2006 election leveled the electoral
playing field for 2008—or perhaps even
tilted it in the Democrats’ favor. Before
the election, we predicted the seats-votes
curve using a district-level model of
elections to translate the average district
vote for Democrats into the number of
seats they would gain ~or lose! in the
House ~Kastellec, Gelman, and Chandler
2006!. This strategy allowed us to pre-
dict systematically the outcome in each
district across a range of hypothetical
swings in the average district vote from
2004 to 2006. Our prediction of the
translation between votes and seats was
largely on the mark: The Democrats
earned 54.8% of the average district
vote, which our model predicted would
lead to them winning 53.1% of the seats,
or 231—just two short of their actual
total of 233.
More generally, we found that in the
range of plausible national election
swings, the Democrats were always des-
tined to receive fewer seats than their
corresponding average vote share. They
were able to gain control of the House
by winning a commanding 54.8% of the
average district vote, the largest margin
for either party since 1990. Had their
vote share been just 2% less, on average,
a significant probability existed that the
Republicans would have retained control
of the House.
Did the Democrats’ gain in 2006
eliminate the partisan bias in favor of
the Republicans? Analysis of each
party’s vote share among their winning
candidates suggests that the Republicans
still hold a natural advantage in that
their winning margins are smaller than
the Democrats, meaning Republicans
“waste” fewer votes. We use our model
to make predictions about the 2008 elec-
tions, and find that the switch in
incumbency advantage from the Repub-
licans to the Democrats may neverthe-
less level the electoral playing field.
Predicting House Elections
Nationally or by Districts
Forecasts of congressional elections
typically focus on the production of a
point prediction: the party out of power
will pick up x seats, meaning they either
will or will not control the House or
Senate or both in the next Congress.
The 2006 campaign witnessed no short-
age of such predictions, with scholars
basing their forecasts on such variables
as presidential approval, economic con-
ditions, and the generic congressional
ballot ~Abramowitz 2006; Bafumi, Erik-
son, and Wlezien 2007; Brandt and
Brunell 2006; Campbell 2006; Cuzân
and Bundrick 2006; Klarner and Bucha-
nan 2006!.2 For the most part, these
predictions were based on inputting
national-level predictors into regression-
based models in order to produce a pre-
dicted seats outcome.3
The use of macro-level variables to
predict either the national vote or the
seat division has a long lineage in the
forecasting literature ~see e.g., Tufte
1975; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984; Op-
penheimer, Stimson, and Waterman
Jonathan P. Kastellec is a Ph.D. candi-
date in the department of political science
at Columbia University. He can be reached
at: jpk2004@columbia.edu.
Andew Gelman is a professor in the de-
partments of statistics and political science
at Columbia University. He can be reached
at: gelman@stat.columbia.edu.
Jamie P. Chandler is a graduate stu-
dent in the department of political science
at the City University of New York Gradu-
ate School and University Center, and a vis-
iting scholar at the Institute for Social and
Economic Research and Policy at Columbia
University. Chandler can be reached at:
jchandler@gc.cuny.edu.
PSOnline www.apsanet.org DOI: 10.1017/S1049096508080207 139
1986; Marra and Ostrom 1989; Abram-
owitz, Cover, and Norpoth 1986; Erik-
son and Sigelman 1995; inter alia!. And
to be sure, macro-level predictions have
their advantages. The point predictions
that result from them are intuitive and
lead to a dichotomous answer—which
party will control the House—that is of
interest to scholars, politicians, the
media, and the public alike. It is also
much easier to collect data at a single
level of analysis per election, allowing
one to ignore idiosyncrasies at the dis-
trict level.
The district level, however, incorpo-
rates a wealth of information that macro-
level predictions throw away by
definition. Variables such as the predis-
position of voters for one party or the
other, incumbency, and whether a race is
uncontested play crucial elements in de-
termining the vote division in each race.
This, in turn, determines who wins each
race, which in turn affects the ultimate
seat division. Thus, predicting the vote at
the district level is true to the actual pro-
cess by which seats are aggregated. It is
also the only way to estimate a seats-
votes curve for a single election. We em-
ploy this estimate to study the level of
partisan bias that favored the Republi-
cans in 2006 and how the Democrats
overcame that bias.
Predicting the Seats-Votes
Curve for a Single Election
We draw our prediction of the seats-
votes curve in 2006 from a statistical
model based on the framework for eval-
uating legislative elections advanced in
Gelman and King ~1994!. The strength
of this approach lies in its ability to
forecast elections under a range of pos-
sible conditions through the use of sim-
ulation analysis that incorporates both a
range of possible national swings and
the predictive uncertainty inherent in
any forecast. This incorporation of un-
certainty allows us to make probabilistic
predictions about the Democrats’
chances of retaking the House. Finally,
the approach is also quite parsimonious,
employing as predictors only the vote in
the prior election in each district,
whether the incumbent is running for
reelection, and whether the race is
contested.
Simulating Election Outcomes
under a Range of Hypothesized
National Swings
Our method can be summarized infor-
mally as follows. ~A formal description,
along with details about variable coding,
appears below.! We begin with the con-
sideration that there is a range of possi-
ble national swings in the average
district vote from one election year to the
next. A swing in the direction of the
Democratic party will help the Demo-
crats pick up more seats; more specifi-
cally, every possible swing will have
different implications in more closely
contested elections and will lead to a
different translation of seats for the Dem-
ocrats. Our general strategy is to allow
the swing to vary across a range of val-
ues, and then predict the outcome of
every district at each interval in the
range. Aggregating these results
produces an estimated seats-votes
curve.
The partisan swing, however, is
unlikely to affect each district in
the same manner. We account for
district-level heterogeneity by in-
corporating incumbency and the
district-level vote from the previous
election, which serves as a proxy
for the district’s overall predisposi-
tion to support the Democratic can-
didate.4 Within each interval of the
possible national swing, we first
use the results of the previous
House election to estimate each
district’s baseline support for the
Democratic candidate. We do so by
reducing the observed vote total in
each district in which an incumbent
ran in the previous election by the
estimated advantage of incumbency;
this measure can be thought of
as the “normal vote” for the previ-
ous election. We then shrink the
normal vote toward 50% to repre-
sent that some of this vote arises from
election-specific events, and we are in-
terested in the part that continues on to
the next election. The next step is to
add back in the estimated incumbency
advantage to the normal vote for incum-
bent candidates in the current election.
This procedure results in a hypothetical
proportion of the Democratic share of
the two-party vote in each district.
To account for uncertainty in the pre-
diction, we simulate the outcome in
each district 1,000 times, adding inde-
pendent normally-distributed errors
whose standard deviation is based on
the residual error from historical House
election forecasts. Finally, for each sim-
ulation, we shift the entire election re-
sult ~that is, add or subtract a constant
from all the districts! so that the average
district vote matches up to that of the
previous election. The result is 1,000
hypothetical election outcomes, each
corresponding to a zero national swing
~but various district-by-district differ-
ences!. The next task is to add the na-
tional swing to each set of district-level
results. We do so in the form of adding
a constant to the predicted value within
each simulation; we set the constant to a
value that ensures that the range of na-
tional swings is centered around the av-
erage district vote from the previous
election.
For every interval in the national
swing ~in the entire range of average
district vote!, we thus have 1,000 pre-
dicted outcomes in each congressional
district. We summarize each simulation
in two ways. First, we compute the av-
erage district vote; second, we compute
Figure 1
Average district vote and percentage of House seats for
Democrats, 1946–2006
Caption: The solid black line depicts the average district vote for Democrats in each House
election from 1946 to 2006. The dotted black line depicts the Democrats’ share of House seats
in the same period. The gray line is a reference for 50% of the vote. Shaded areas represent
periods of Republican control. The graph illustrates how the party in control of Congress tends to
win a greater share of seats than votes, as the Republicans did in every election from 1996 to
2004 following their takeover of the House in 1994.
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the proportion of House seats won by
the Democrats. Taking the mean seat
proportion over all the simulations
yields an expected seat share for the
Democrats.5 We then simply “connect
the dots” of Democratic share in each
interval, producing a predicted seats-
votes curve.
Formally, we model the vote in each
district as follows:
vi
t  a t  r t~vi
t1 c tIit1 !
 cIit d t  «i ,«i;N~0,s 2 !, ~1!
where v  the Democratic share of the
two-party vote ~as a number between 0
and 1!, i indexes districts, t represents
the current election ~that in which the
seats-votes curve is being predicted!,
and t-1 the previous election. The
incumbency variable ~defined in each
district in each election year! is I  1 if
the incumbent in the district is a Demo-
crat and seeking reelection, 1 if the
incumbent is a Republican and seeking
reelection, and 0 if the seat is open.
For values of c ~the estimated
incumbency advantage!, we use the
trend of the values estimated in Gelman
and Huang ~forthcoming!, who find a
steadily increasing incumbency advan-
tage from the 1940s to 1980, and a
constant value of around 8% ever
since.6 The coefficient r captures the
autocorrelation of votes between elec-
tions.7 The national swing d is set to
values ranging from 0.10 to 0.10 ~that
is, considering swings of up to 10% of
the vote!, with the constant term a set
so that the national vote swing equals 0
when d  0.8
For every value of dt, we simulate our
model 1,000 times. For each simulation,
we record the share of seats predicted to
be won by Democratic candidates ~that
is, ~10n!(i1
n 1vit5 !, where n equals the
number of districts in a given election
year.9 We then take the average seat
share measure to produce an expected
seat proportion for the Democrats at the
given value of dt. We repeat this proce-
dure over a range of values of dt, allow-
ing for a predicted translation between
votes and seats at a plausible range of
national swings.
Validating by Fitting to
Previous Elections
To demonstrate the validity of our
method, we applied it to the 19 non-
redistricting election years ~i.e., those
not ending in “2”! from 1958 to 2004.
Figure 2 plots the predicted seats-votes
curve for each year, along with the ac-
tual average district vote and seat share
for the Democrats. The model performs
fairly well, with a root mean-squared
error of about 0.02, or about nine seats
out of 435. Two elections ~1960 and
1980! contribute disproportionately to
the predictive error, as the model was
off by 26 and 19 seats, respectively, in
those years. For 10 of the elections, the
prediction error was less than four seats.
The root mean-squared error of the pre-
dictive standard deviation of seats given
votes is 0.01, or about four seats, imply-
ing that the rest of the predictive error
is due to year-to-year variation un-
explained by the model. Thus, the
model is not perfect, but we believe it
demonstrates ample validity to serve as
a useful tool for studying the relation-




In this article we have summarized
election results using the average district
vote—that is, the parties’ share of the
two-party vote, averaged over the 435
congressional districts: for the Demo-
crats, this is ~10n!(i1
n vi . This is the
usual way that political scientists aggre-
gate congressional vote ~King and Gel-
man 1991; Gelman and King 1994! and
is a reasonable summary in that it is rela-
tively immune to turnout variation and
represents the national level of support
for the party.
An alternative measure is the share of
total vote that goes to the Democrats,
which can be written as (i1
n Ti vi 0
(i1
n Ti , where Ti is the turnout ~the
number of votes for the two major par-
ties! in district i . Total vote differs from
average district vote because of district-
by-district variation in turnout, which is
correlated with the parties’ vote shares.
Figure 3 shows the time series of av-
erage district vote and total vote for the
Democrats over the past 60 years. In the
early period, the Democrats’ average dis-
trict vote was much higher than their
total vote share, which can be attributed
to their large number of uncontested,
low-turnout districts in the South. In the
past 15 years, a gap has again opened
up, this time of about three percentage
points, because the Democrats do better
in low-turnout districts ~for example, in
inner cities!. This trend continued in
2006: the Democrats won 54.8% of the
average district vote, but only 53.3% of
the total vote.
As noted above, we prefer average
district vote as a summary measure
of national support for the parties,
and so that is what we have used in this
article.
Predicting and Dissecting the
2006 Seats-Vote Curve
Using this method, we predicted prior
to the election the seats-votes curve for
2006, along with estimated probabilities
of the Democrats taking control of the
House given their average district vote.10
The graph on the left of Figure 4
presents the estimated seats-votes curve,
along with the actual average district
vote and the percentage of seats the
Democrats won.11 The graph on the right
of Figure 4 depicts the predicted proba-
bility of the Democrats winning the
House given their average district vote.12
The points respectively show the actual
average district vote and seat share for
the Democrats, and the predicted proba-
bility that the Democrats would win the
House, based on the actual average dis-
trict vote. As the seats-votes curve dem-
onstrates, our prediction was very close
to the mark. The Democrats earned
54.8% of the average district vote, an
amount that we predicted would lead to
them gaining 53.1% of the seats, or 231
seats. In actuality, they won 233 seats.
We estimated that the Democrats had a
92% probability of winning the House
based on their average district vote.
Our model confirms that the Demo-
crats faced a stacked electoral deck head-
ing into the 2006 elections. They needed
52% of the average district vote just to
have a 50% probability of winning the
House, and needed nearly 55% ~which
they obtained! to ensure control. To bor-
row Krugman’s ~2006! metaphor, the
Democrats needed a “storm surge” to
overcome the “high Republican levee”
erected by the Republicans’ structural
advantages.
The source of the bias could be found
largely in the difference between districts
controlled by the two parties: some of
this difference was due to geographic
factors and favorable redistricting, and
some to the Republicans’ incumbency
advantage. Figure 5 presents separate
histograms of the vote shares for Demo-
cratic and Republican winners ~excluding
uncontested races! from each election
from 1996 to 2006, along with the mean
vote percentage for each. Consider first
the five elections preceding 2006. In
each year, the distribution of Democratic
winner vote shares is more symmetric
than that of Republicans, with a large
percentage of Democratic winners earn-
ing more than 75% of the vote each year.
In contrast, the distribution of Republi-
can winner vote shares is much more
skewed toward 50%, meaning they won
their races by much smaller margins. In
each year the mean Democratic winning
vote share is also larger than the mean
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Republican winning vote share. Con-
sider 2004: the Democrats won their
victories with an average of 69% of
the vote, while the Republicans aver-
aged 65% in their contests, thus
“wasting” fewer votes. The Republi-
cans won 47 races with less than
60% of the vote; the Democrats only
28. Many Democrats are in districts
where they win overwhelmingly,
while many Republicans are winning
the close races.
So how did the Democrats’ over-
come the Republicans’ advantages in
2006? In one sense, the answer is
easy: they simply obtained a large
enough share of the votes to guaran-
tee control of the House. Their aver-
age district vote of 54.8% was the
Figure 2
Seats-votes curve prediction and actual election results, 1958–2004 (excluding
redistricting years)
Caption: For each year, the line depicts the estimated seats-votes curve, and the dot shows the actual election result. The light gray lines
are references for 50% of the vote and 50% of the seats. As is well known (King and Gelman 1991), seats-votes curves have become less
steep in recent decades—a given swing in votes will typically result in a lower swing in seats than before. As the plots show, the actual
election result typically conforms closely to the predicted seats-votes curve.
Figure 3
Democrats’ share of the two-party total vote and average
district vote in House elections, 1946–2006
Caption: Shaded areas represent periods of Republican control of the House.
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largest since 1990, and three points
higher than the 51.6% Republicans re-
ceived in their landslide year of 1994. If
the Democrats had received that same
average district vote in 2006, according
to our seats-votes curve the Democrats
would have had only a 44% probability
of winning the House. Thus, it took a
large national swing for the Democrats
to ensure their victory.
At the same time, the size of the
Democrats’ vote gain and seat gain ob-







54.8% of the vote
in 2006, we esti-
mate they would
have won about
249 seats, or 16
seats more than the
Democrats ob-
tained. Less obvi-




in office. Of the
211 Republicans
who ran for reelec-
tion, 189 won ~or
90%!; of those 211
winners, 47 ~or
25%! earned less
than 58% of the vote, meaning their vic-
tory can be attributed to the incumbency
advantage ~recall that the estimated aver-
age incumbency advantage is eight per-
centage points @Gelman and Huang
forthcoming#!. By contrast, all 191 Dem-
ocratic incumbents who ran won; and
only seven won by less than 58% of the
vote. The last column in Figure 5 paints
a more general picture, showing that in
2006 the Democratic victors continued
their pattern of winning larger vote mar-
gins than their Republican winners. In
fact, the difference between the mean
vote shares of the two parties’ winning
candidates exceeded those of the previ-
ous five elections. And of the 118 races
where the victor won with less than 60%
of the vote, Republican candidates won
78 of them ~or 66%!.
Looking Ahead to 2008
It thus seems possible that the size of
the Democratic victory hides a continu-
ing structural disadvantage in House
elections.13 Looking ahead to 2008, one
advantage the Democrats will have is
that with their takeover of the House,
the incumbency advantage will shift to
them. Will this level the electoral play-
ing field? While it is too early to make
firm predictions about the 2008 elec-
tions, we can use our model to construct
a preliminary estimation of the 2008
seats-votes curve to predict whether the
Democrats might still face a partisan
bias. Recall that our model depends on
knowing which incumbents are running
for re-election; because that is unknow-
able at this point, for each simulation
we simply assume every incumbent had
a 90% probability of running.14 We also
assume that there will be no uncontested
races. For consistency with our 2006
analysis, we examine the probability of
the Democrats keeping control of the
House in 2008, given their average dis-
trict vote.
The results are presented in Figure 6.
The results suggest that the Democrats’
Figure 4
2006
Caption: (l) Predicted seats-votes curve for 2006; the point depicts
the actual average district vote for Democrats (54.8%) and their
share of House seats. Our point prediction was that they would win
231 seats (or 53.1% of seats) based on their average district vote of
54.8%, which turned out to be just two less than their actual total of
233 (53.6%) seats. (r) The predicted probability the Democrats
would control the House given their average district vote. Light lines
are references for 10%, 50%, and 90% probabilities. We estimate
that the Democrats had a 90% probability of winning the House
given the vote share they received.
Figure 5
Distribution of vote margins for Democrats and Republicans in winning races,
1996–2006
Caption: For each year, the top histogram depicts the distribution of the Democratic share of the two-party vote in districts where Democrats
won, while the bottom histogram gives the Republican share of the two-party vote in districts won by Republicans. The dotted lines
represent mean vote shares. We exclude uncontested races to avoid clustering around 75%. For all years, the distribution of vote shares for
Democratic winners is much more symmetric than for Republican winners, who are more skewed toward 50%. Likewise, the mean vote
share for Democratic winners is systematically higher than that of Republican winners. In these years, Republicans “wasted” fewer votes,
which contributed to the partisan bias against Democrats. This trend became even more pronounced in 2006.
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victory in 2006 did indeed remove the
bias that favored the Republicans. Our
model estimates that the Democrats will
need just 49% of the vote to have a 50%
probability of retaining control of the
House, meaning the Republicans will
need 51% to have an even chance of
retaking it. Thus, while the Democrats
may enjoy a parti-
san bias in 2008, it
will likely be much
less than the Re-
publicans enjoyed






On the one hand, if
our model is cor-
rect, the 51% of the
average district
vote they will need
to have a 50%
probability of
retaking the House
is larger than any
percentage they have received since
1994. On the other, the Democrats will
need to defend the seats of their first-
term members who won in Republican-
leaning districts in 2006, and are unlikely
to receive as large an average vote share
as they did in 2006. For this reason, the
Democratic leadership gave these fresh-
man favorable committee assignments in
an effort to boost their incumbency ad-
vantage ~Nagourney 2006!.
Conclusion
We used a parsimonious model of
elections to predict and analyze the
translation between votes and seats in the
2006 House elections, and to make a
preliminary assessment of the 2008 elec-
tion. We validated the model on the pre-
vious half-century of House elections, as
shown in Figure 2. As a methodological
matter, it is crucial that we both took a
district-level approach and estimated a
separate seats-votes curve for each elec-
tion, rather than combining several elec-
tion results to estimate a time-averaged
curve, as is often done. Our results show
that it took a large wave of Democratic
support in 2006 to overcome the Repub-
licans’ structural advantages, and that the
Democrats’ newfound incumbency ad-
vantage will help them in their efforts to
retain control of the House in 2008,
while by no means guaranteeing it.
Notes
* We thank Gary Jacobson and Walt Borges
for generously sharing their data, Robert Erik-
son, Eduardo Leoni, Robert Shapiro, David Ep-
stein, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful
comments, and the National Science Foundation
for financial support. Replication datasets and
statistical code are available at www.columbia.
edu0;jpk20040house2006.html.
1. A similar dynamic has existed in Senate
elections: in the 2000, 2002, and 2004 elections
~during which 100 senators were elected!, Dem-
ocratic candidates earned a combined three mil-
lion more votes than Republican candidates, yet
the Republicans retained control of the chamber.
2. The point predictions among these fore-
casts ranged from a low of Democrats winning
216 seats ~Campbell 2006! to a high of them
winning 235 seats ~Bafumi, Erikson, and Wle-
zien 2007!. The latter, which is similar to our
approach in that the authors estimate a seats-vote
curve based on the generic congressional ballot,
came closest to the actual mark of 233.
3. Two exceptions are Bafumi, Erikson, and
Wlezien ~2007! and Klarner and Buchanan
~2006!, who incorporate both district-level and
national-level information.
4. For all analyses that appear in this arti-
cle, we impute the district vote for uncontested
races to 0.75 for Democratic winners and 0.25
for Republican winners. These values are derived
in King and Gelman ~1991! and Gelman and
King ~1994!, based on the vote shares received
in the last election before a district became un-
contested and the first election after a district
became uncontested. The average of these values
was about 0.75 for the incumbent party and rep-
resents the average “effective support” for the
party in uncontested races. For a measure based
on the presidential vote in congressional dis-
tricts, see Erikson ~2006!.
5. Similar results are obtained by using the
median instead of the mean to summarize pre-
dictive uncertainty.
6. Specifically, we set c  0.08~~year-
1946!0~1980–1946!! if year 1980, or c  0.08
if year  1980.
7. We obtain values of r by regressing vit
on vi
t1
, along with incumbency and party indi-
cators, for each non-redistricting election year
~i.e., those not ending in “2”! from 1946–2004.
For each election year analyzed, we take the av-
erage of the coefficient on the lagged vote from
the previous five years. The estimates of r have
a mean of 0.68 with a standard deviation of 0.11.
8. We set s to 0.066, which is the mean of
the residual standard deviations from the yearly
regressions discussed in the previous endnote.
9. In 1958 and 1960, respectively, 436 and
437 seats were contested due to the addition of
Alaska and Hawaii as states. We also dropped
the handful of races featuring third-party
candidates ~with the exception of Bernard
Sanders—an independent who held Vermont’s
congressional seat from 1998–2004 and who
organized with the Democratic party—whom we
classified as a Democrat!.
10. Information on incumbency status and
retiring members was obtained from www.cq.
com. Information on uncontested candidates was
obtained from Giroux ~2006!—candidates were
considered uncontested if they were either a
Democrat who did not face a Republican chal-
lenger or a Republican who did not face a Dem-
ocratic challenger.
11. Vote totals for the Democratic and Re-
publican candidates are based on official certi-
fied results from each state. As noted earlier, for
each uncontested race, we imputed the vote to
0.25 for districts where no Democratic candidate
ran and 0.75 for districts where no Republican
candidate ran. Three districts warrant explana-
tion. In Louisiana’s 2nd district, where incum-
bent William Jefferson ~D! won in a runoff
election held in December 2006, we used the
results of the original election to measure the
Democrats’ vote in the district because the runoff
only featured Democratic candidates. In Texas’
23rd district, incumbent Henry Bonilla ~R! was
defeated in a December 2006 runoff. Here we
used the results from the runoff election since it
was contested by both parties. Finally, we used
the official certified results from the election in
Florida’s 13th district, which was marred by ap-
parent voting-machine malfunctions.
12. We generated predicted probabilities by
taking the deterministic seats prediction ~the ex-
pected value from a probabilistic district-by-
district prediction! at each interval of the
national swing and then adding predictive uncer-
tainty based on the root mean-squared error of
the historical seats-votes curves presented in
Figure 2.
13. The bias the Democrats face in the Sen-
ate is even more severe due to the Republicans’
geographic advantage. As Hacker and Pierson
~2006, 12! point out, “@a#ssuming senators repre-
sent half their states’ residents, the 49 Democrats
in the @110th# Senate represent approximately
40 million more Americans than the 49
Republicans.”
14. In each year since 1996, no fewer than




Caption: (l) Predicted seats-votes curve for 2008; (r) The predicted
probability the Democrats will control the House given their average
district vote. Light lines are references for 10%, 50%, and 90%
probabilities.
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